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considerably by developing elasticities based on measure-
ment of what happens in situations of actual change.
A further refinementmight be to take into account the
possibility of alternative pathways from alcohol pricing to
health and social problems. The Meier et al. model takes a
well-trodden pathway followed at least since Bruun et al.
[12] in 1975: price and other control measures influence
consumption level, which in turn influences levels of
problems. However, the crucial issue for public health is
whether the intervention in pricing influences the levels
of problems, and it can do this in ways which do not pass
through the consumption level, for instance by influenc-
ing contexts of drinking and after drinking. Some years
ago, the economist Philip Cook pioneered this direct
approach in analysis [13], and also examining this path
might be a useful addition.
In all, the work presented by Meier et al. represents an
impressive piece of modelling, offering a rich feast for
policy discussions but, as the authors concede fully, it is
limited by the data which are available. There is much
work for the future in collecting more appropriate and
more reliable data fromwhich to develop robust estimates
of policy impacts. In the meantime, modelling exercises
such as this are a useful contribution to thinking and
action on alcohol policies, but it is important not to reify
the results and to keep inmind the uncertainties inherent
in what is presented.
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LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF ALCOHOL
POLICIES: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
In this issue of the Addiction, Meier, Purshouse & Brennan
[1] (hereafter ‘the authors’) present modelling results
of different alcohol pricing policies. Excessive alcohol
consumption is related to many life-threatening diseases
[2]. Policies reducing alcohol abuse increase population
health, with further beneficial effects to be expected
outside the health care sector. The authors argue that
heterogeneous modelling is needed to understand the
differences in effects of policies affecting various types
of alcohol consumption; for instance, consumption by
youth in bars versus supermarket purchases by adult
men. They present their outcomes as net present values,
without paying explicit attention to the timing of effects.
This commentary focuses upon the long-term effects of
alcohol policies from an economic perspective. We argue
that once different alcohol consumption subgroups are
distinguished, the time dimension becomes crucial.
To illustrate the time dimension, let us consider the life
of a hypothetical person called Joe. Joe works in a factory
Commentaries 395
© 2010 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2010 Society for the Study of Addiction Addiction, 105, 394–401
and each day after work drinks five beers. At weekends he
goes to a bar with friends and has about 10 beers. At age
50 he suffers fromaheart attack, which causes him to cut
back on work for a few months. For the rest of his life Joe
is on medication. He retires at age 65 and dies at age 70
from a fatal stroke. Joe’s life could have taken a different
course. Had he changed his alcohol consumption
because of, for instance, a major tax increase, Joe would
never have had a heart attack. In this parallel world of
Joe, he would have gained quality of life as of age 50.
Moreover, his boss would have been happy because Joe
would not have needed to cut back on his work. He would
not have had a stroke, but would have lived until 85,
although suffering from dementia from age 75. That is,
he would have lived longer and enjoyed more of his
pension. However, in some of these so-called ‘added’ life
years his quality of life would have been severely dimin-
ished. Of course, this is a stylized example, but it shows
the important mechanism of postponement. By avoiding
a heart attack, death is postponed. However, at later age
substitute diseases cause losses in quality of life and add
to health care utilization.
On a macro level a decrease in alcohol consumption
leads to a decrease in the incidence of alcohol-related
diseases, such as stroke and cardiovascular disease, but
an increase in age-related diseases in a now older popu-
lation. Similar mechanisms are at work in the case of
tobacco control and overweight reduction [3,4]. With
respect to health care costs, the increase in health care
utilization might even outweigh the savings of avoiding
alcohol-related diseases [5]. If we broaden the scope and
look at productivity, similar mechanisms are present.
We saw in Joe’s example that the avoidance of a heart
attack resulted in net productivity gains, but also in addi-
tional years of retired life. In general, added years occur
at older, usually less productive ages [6]. While young
people in general produce more than they consume, the
reverse can be said of older people [7].
Turning to heterogeneity and combining it with the
time dimension, all diseases related to alcohol occurmore
frequently at older ages, and therefore health effects are
long-term effects. Different pricing policies affect different
groups in society differently, as stressed by the authors.
Policies that affect younger drinkers will have health
effects further into the future than policies targeting older
drinkers. Taking into account discounting of future
effects, therefore, could mean that the same health effects
would be valued less in a younger age group than those in
an older age group [8]. Ultimately, cost–benefit estimates
could shed light on the value for money of the different
policy options, accounting for all relevant health effects
and related costs [9].
The main advantage of modelling is that by specifying
mathematical relations between epidemiological quanti-
ties new insights and outcomes can be generated that
cannot be estimated directly from data [10]. Modelling
can thus be seen as a form of evidence synthesis. The
authors have presented an impressive modelling exercise
in which they stress the importance of modelling hetero-
geneity. However, the modelling approach used by the
authors does not allowus to quantify effects of policy over
time, but rather attributes effects ex post. As we have
argued above, the different policies probably differ in the
timing of their effects. A next step therefore might be to
quantify the dynamic effects of alcohol policies.
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BEYOND TAX: THE NEED FOR
RESEARCH ON ALCOHOL
PRICING POLICIES
Numerous factors influence the price of alcoholic bever-
ages, from the type and quality of the product to where it
is purchased. While higher excise taxes on alcoholic bev-
erages are the primary policy lever for raising prices,
there are a variety of other policies that do the same. In
contrast to the large and continually growing body of
research that shows that higher alcoholic beverage excise
taxes, by raising price, reduce drinking and its conse-
quences [1,2], almost nothing is known about the impact
of policies regulating wholesale and retail distribution
and pricing. The same is largely true when it comes to
understanding the impact of policies that target the
industry pricing promotions that can vary with quantity,
location and other factors.
In their paper in this issue of Addiction, Meier and her
colleagues add to the very limited evidence base on these
issues [3]. Using unique data from England that include a
variety of measures of the types and quantities of alco-
holic beverages consumed, where these beverages are
purchased, and the prices paid for them, they explore the
potential impact of a range of policies that affect alco-
holic beverages prices and drinking among different
population subgroups. Consistent with extensive previ-
ous research, they find that alcohol prices have a signifi-
cant impact on drinking behavior—from choice of
beverage and location to the quantity consumed. Their
unique contribution, however, is in demonstrating that
policies that impact prices differentially—from minimum
pricing policies to bans on discounting—have different
effects on drinking that vary with the type of drinking
(e.g. moderate, hazardous and harmful) and across
drinkers (based on gender and age). As Meier and her
colleagues conclude, a mix of policies that target price is
called for when governments adopt pricing policies aimed
at curbing the harmful consequences of drinking.
As the authors note, the approach they have taken can
be adapted to other countries where there are similarly
complex policies that have different effects on alcoholic
beverage prices. Such research would be quite timely
in the United States. Following the repeal of Prohibition
in the United States, states adopted many varied combi-
nations of policies governing the wholesale and retail dis-
tribution of alcoholic beverages as part of the creation of
a ‘three-tier system’ for alcohol distribution [4]. These
include state control overwholesale and/or retail distribu-
tion of at least some beverages (which allows the state to
directly set prices for the controlled beverages), minimum
pricingpolicies, bansonquantity discounts, requirements
that wholesalers post and hold their prices and limits on
price promotions (e.g. bans on ‘happy hour’ specials and
free samples). However, research on the impact of these
policies on the prices drinkers pay for alcoholic beverages,
drinking behavior and the consequences of drinking is
almost non-existent [2].
In recent years, these policies in US states have been
eroding in the face of legal challenges from the alcoholic
beverage industry over their perceived anti-competitive
effects. In Maryland, for example, one large regional
retailer has challenged the state’s ban on quantity dis-
counts for wine and spirits at the wholesale level and the
related price post-and-hold requirements (TFWS v.
Schaefer et al.). In Washington, a large national retailer
has challenged a broader set of policies regulating whole-
sale distribution that includes minimum mark-up, cash
payment and direct deliver provisions, in addition to the
state’s ban on quantity discounts and related post-and-
hold requirements (Costco v. Hoen et al.). The states have
used a ‘21st amendment’ defense to oppose these legal
challenges, arguing that these policies are consistent
with the state interests in promoting temperance and
reducing the harms from excessive drinking and the
authority granted to states by the constitutional amend-
ment repealing Prohibition. To date, states’ ability to
defend these policies has been hampered by the lack
of published evidence on the impact of these policies on
alcoholic beverage prices, drinking and its consequences.
The type of evidence Meier and her colleagues’ provide
for England, adapted appropriately to the US environ-
ment, would be invaluable in responding to the inevitable
future challenges to comparable policies in other states.
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